1,2 One solution to meet the recent interest within the US government for more responsive space systems is the ability for increased on-orbit manuever. To date, responsive launch has been the primary approach for providing responsive space capabilities; however, spacecraft with significant delta V can also provide very meaningful capabilities through on-orbit maneuver. With the correct initial orbital conditions, spacecraft maneuvers can provide much of the same utility as responsive launch for less than 100 m/s of velocity change, without launching a new rocket and spacecraft. The difficulty is determining the correct orbit and concept of operations that provides the right level of flexibility to be responsive to user needs. This paper examines the types of orbits that are most effective for these new applications. Preliminary results show that small burns can hasten or delay a pass, work to change the orbital plane to something more suitable for a given theater, or change the time over target and geometry within the theater. These results suggest that such an employment of space power can indeed be very useful, offering additional capabilities that responsive launch in itself cannot match and warrants additional investigation.
BACKGROUND
Although spacecraft move at high speeds relative to observers on the Earth, this motion is generally not considered dynamic or responsive. Once a satellite is 1 1 U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright. 2 IEEEAC paper #1640, Version 2, Updated Jan, 23 2006 delivered to orbit, it has little or no orbital maneuvering capability. Most orbit perturbations are well understood and do not cause significant short-term effects. Orbital motion is readily defined by the laws of physics, and when the perturbations are applied, the motion of a satellite becomes very predictable. Using an orbit propagator and observed data, one can easily determine where a spacecraft will be in subsequent hours, days, and possibly even weeks. Also, to avoid the confusion of changing reference frames, many mission designers take advantage of static global constellations. Sun-synchronous (for Electo-Optical missions) or geosynchronous (for Radio Frequency missions) orbits minimize the number of changing variables for the mission planner. These orbits keep consistent ground tracks in an Earth-fixed reference frame and allow users easy access to the spacecraft's capabilities. This approach to space has led us to our current architecture. In an everchanging and increasingly dynamic world, it is time to reexamine this policy.
Recent focused efforts, such as the joint Air Force and DARPA Force Application and Launch from CONUS (FALCON) Program and the TacSat initiative, have pushed technologies forward and explored responsive launch vehicles and low cost small satellites as key enablers for more dynamic space capabilities. Responsive Space has been examined under a different name as recent as the early 1990s. When the demonstrations failed to meet the desired cost, reliability, and performance, the program failed to move forward. Reborn in 2003 through the FALCON Program, Responsive Space will have another chance to prove that its architecture is valid through a series of tests and experiments as well as the scrutiny of the DoD corporate planning process, which along with Congress will ultimately dictate funding for the effort. It is unclear at this time whether Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) will have enough funding to continue forward through this tight fiscal environment.
Although Responsive Space has always been a philosophy where space systems are more flexible and responsive to user's needs than traditional systems, only recently has that involved looking at options beside responsive launch.
First we must define and describe the concept of Responsive Space.
Approaches for Operationally Responsive Space
Responsive Space describes an approach to build a dynamic space order of battle. This philosophy is dynamic in four areas:
1. Rapidly configuring spacecraft and payloads on the ground or reconfiguring satellites on-orbit 2. Quickly launching and operating satellites 3. Building an enterprise which can dynamically respond to emerging missions 4. Maneuvering operational or predeployed on-orbit assets.
The first of these approaches represents the desire to push towards common platforms with plug-n-play payloads and the use of software programmable components or orbits that are flexible enough to support new missions. The second approach is responsive launch, which has been talked about quite persistently for the last several years. The FALCON Program intends to promote the flight of 2 or 3 new vehicles within the next few years using this concept. There seems to be few technical challenges with responsive launch; however, there still is quite a bit of thinking that needs to be done with respect to how responsive the requirements need to be, what a reasonable salvo rate would be, and what the real throw-weight and orbit requirements are for the operational satellites.
Another key piece that Responsive Space seeks to change is the broader space enterprise. Right now fielding a new system takes far too long to design, build, and certify. Common or modular platforms and systems with larger economies of scale will drastically change this to allow systems to be imagined, built, and put in orbit much more quickly and at a lower cost.
Maneuvering operational satellites, the focus of this paper, is another potential source of dynamism in space that is currently overlooked. As such, this paper will examine the physics behind desired orbital maneuvers and see where these offer the best potential capability.
RATIONALE
The key advantage of space vehicles over airplanes or dirigibles has been access. While nations could claim sovereignty over national airspace, the orbital regime remained uncontrolled. Incidents, such as the famous 1960 crash of Francis Gary Power's U-2, highlighted this distinction as the Soviet Union was better able to control its national air space. Taking advantage of the fact that satellites act according to Kepler's laws, not necessarily a particular nation's laws, provided a key rational for developing the sophisticated space "eyes and ears" of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). This also led to the next key principle of space power -global coverage. Due to the high velocity of spacecraft, global coverage of the Earth became the standard. This has made space particularly useful for the global utilities such as communication; position, navigation and timing; early warning; and weather. Where the Air Force employs most of its capabilities today is largely based on requirements driven from a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union with systems like MILSTAR, the Defense Support Program (DSP), and others. However, with the end of the Cold War, defense planners are now directing their attention to new adversaries. In the Information Age, while we fight a global war on terror, other uses of space are becoming appealing.
Changing Paradigms
With the domination of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) across all levels of the battle space, not only are people beginning to question the role of the manned aircraft in the future, but they are beginning to examine how space services can serve the warfighter at the tactical level. Traditionally, space systems have been nearly exclusively viewed as global capabilities. Space operators view space assets only based on their groundtrack plotted on a static 2-dimensional Earth map. Because the orbits of the spacecraft are so well known, there is no need to think of space from a different reference frame. One of the key problems with this approach for the tactical warfighter is that it is very difficult to get timely data and capability from our national global systems. Further, these systems are not tailored for tactical needs. When planners look to develop new space capabilities, they are tied to these global ways of looking at space with large robust constellations and the corresponding high cost and high level command structure. UAVs have a very different type of command structure, one that is much more tactically responsive and useful. There is a big desire for space systems to be responsive to the tactical user in this way. The belief is that lower levels of control will shorten the user's Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop to allow a more lethal and capable military for the information age.
Another paradigm that Responsive Space must challenge is the idea of global persistence. True 24/7 global persistence drives very large constellations, or large expensive spacecraft in geostationary orbit, when continuous global coverage is desired. Responsive Space requires a different look at the idea of persistence, which should not be thought of as 24/7 coverage, but as only when you need coverage. This is where on-orbit maneuver can provide a new capability that is not there at all times, but when the user needs it. This type of capability can provide a nice complement to UAVs and other existing platforms when access or sustained operations is an issue. Maneuvering has the ability to overcome denial and deception tactics that an enemy can employ against a static orbital configuration. It also adds an element of surprise, which is a key principle of war. In an increasingly unstable and changing world, this is certainly a capability for the nation to investigate.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
There are two basic new capabilities that a dynamic spaceflight concept of operations brings to a military commander.
Changing Time and Geometry over Target
Changing time of overflight allows a military commander to synchronize his space forces to the ground scheme of maneuver. This type of capability could also be used to change a sensor geometry to allow access to a target. Changing overflight time and geometry will provide dedicated space-based services according to the user's needs.
Tailoring Space Assets to a New Theater
One of the heralded space successes of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was tailoring the Global Positioning System (GPS) space segment to provide slightly better coverage over theater in Iraq. This effort is a glimpse of what could be possible using a spacecraft designed for increased maneuverability. By leveraging natural plane recession and apsidal rotation, a shrewd space operator will be able to tailor his orbit to serve a specific theater. This capability is particularly subject to the amount of time allocated for the maneuver and the initial state of the orbit prior to the maneuver.
ORBITS OF INTEREST
To investigate the spectrum of possibilities in Responsive Space, an analysis of a variety of orbit types was undertaken. A list of the analyzed orbits and their applicability is listed below:
(1) Tailored Low Earth Orbit (TLEO): A low altitude orbit that is inclined to approximately four degrees above the target latitude. This type of orbit has been baselined for the first three TacSat demonstrations and is a candidate for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions that might benefit from consistently low altitude and can accept shorter passes.
(2) Sun-synchronous (SunSync): This orbit's nodal regression rate is matched to the rotation of the Earth around the sun so that the satellite passes over the target at the same time each day. This orbit is useful if viewing is restricted to daylight hours or consistent viewing angles are required.
(3) Repeating Groundtrack, Period = 24/9 hrs (RGT9): A medium altitude orbit that is highly inclined and elliptical. It has a repeating groundtrack and passes over the target at least twice a day -one ascending pass and one descending pass. There are many other variations of this type of orbit which can be tailored to a specific theater, this orbit was chosen as a representative orbit of this type.
(4) Critically Inclined Eccentric Orbit, Period = 24/8 hrs (CI8): This orbit has a 3 hour period and a repeating groundtrack. It is critically inclined at 63.4 degrees, which fixes the argument of perigee. Loiter times above the target range approximately 1-1.5 hours when the apogee is placed in the same hemisphere as the target. This type of orbit is well suited for communications or other RF applications over a specific hemisphere. Relatively small constellations of this orbit type can give the user significant persistence.
(5) Non-critically Inclined Eccentric Orbit, Period = 24/8 hrs (NCI8): A three hour period orbit that has the same orbital parameters as the CI8 orbit, except that it is not critically inclined. The argument of perigee rotates approximately 3 deg/day and propulsion must be used if a fixed argument of perigee is desired. This orbit was chosen as a representative Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) that is not critically inclined and will experience significant nodal and apsidal perturbations.
(6) COBRA: An orbit developed by Draim [1] that has an eight hour period and a long loiter time over the target. Its argument of perigee is placed at 226.5 degrees, which shapes the groundtrack like a cobra in its strike position. Maximum communication range to the ground varies from 2363 km at perigee to 31640 km at apogee.
A diagram of the six orbits is shown in Figure 2 . The orbital properties of each orbit are listed in Table 1 , where h a and h p are the apogee and perigee altitudes, respectively; and e, i, and ω are the Keplerian orbital elements of eccentricity, inclination, and argument of perigee. The argument of perigee for orbits other than Cobra and the circular TLEO is assumed to be 270 deg, which places apogee at the northern most point in the orbit. When comparing these orbits for Responsive Space maneuvers, it is important to keep in mind that there is an initial price to be paid to place satellites in each of these orbits, with some orbits being more costly to reach than others. In other words, these orbits represent different starting baseline costs. These orbits were selected as a representative set which would be useful for Responsive Space maneuvers. They were roughly constrained by planned launch vehicle capability; however, some of the higher energy HEOs would require some kind of additional upper stage.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Preliminary analysis was performed to provide quantitative data to support the two desired Concepts of Operations for on-orbit maneuvering in the orbits described above.
Changing Time and Geometry over Target
The first maneuver examined is to advance or delay the arrival of a satellite over a target by a relatively small amount of time. The ability to alter the time of arrival to a target is driven largely by an adversary's ability and approach for conducting Space Situational Awareness (SSA). We chose a simple first order approach to assess this capability. It is assumed that the enemy can only view the satellite from the target location and does not have access to tracking data from other locations on the globe. In order to provide an unexpected change in arrival time, the vehicle must perform all maneuvers while out-of-view of the target. For this paper, it is assumed that the target has a latitude of 33 deg N.
Typically, the time between revolutions of a satellite does not allow adequate time to significantly alter the satellite's orbital properties. It is best to wait until the satellite will not be in view of the target for a couple of revolutions or more. Looking at Figure 3 , we see a typical elevation plot for a TLEO spacecraft over flying a target. Each spike in the graph represents a single pass of the spacecraft over the target, with the peak being the maximum elevation angle of Figure 2 -Orbits of Interest the satellite for that pass. It is seen that the TLEO satellite is in view of the target for a group of passes, and then there is a portion of time (shown with arrows) where the satellite does not reach high enough elevation angles. This portion of time is referred to in this document as the "maneuver gap," and is the preferred location to perform the arrival time change maneuver. The elevation plot for a SunSync orbit is displayed in Figure 4 . Since the SunSync orbit has a higher inclination and a longer period, the passes of the satellite are wider and further apart. This shrinks the maneuver gap time, which shows that increasing the orbital altitude does not directly correlate to increasing the maneuver gap.
The column titled Δt G in Table 2 lists the maneuver gaps determined for each of the orbits under investigation. For the orbits with repeating groundtracks (RGT8, CI8, NCI8, and COBRA) the maneuver gap is a constant value. For the TLEO and SunSync orbits, the maneuver gap changes as the geometry with respect to the target varies. For these two non-repeating orbits, a conservative value is used by taking the minimum gap time over a 60 day period. The second column of Table 2 shows the ratio of the maneuver gap to the period of the original orbit (P 0 ).
Having determined the maneuver time available, a simple calculation is performed to determine how much ΔV would be required to alter the arrival time. The simplest method to change the arrival time is to rephase the satellite within its orbit. This maneuver is completed in two steps. First, a burn is performed to raise/lower the apogee height of the original orbit so that the satellite's new period lengthens/shortens. This burn is performed once the satellite reaches perigee, which is the most cost effective way to change apogee height. The satellite remains on the intermediate orbit for a given number of revolutions until the target is about to come into view again. A second burn is performed at perigee to return the satellite back to the original orbit before overflight occurs. It is assumed that the original orbit was selected based on mission requirements and that the satellite must return to the original orbit to properly complete the desired task.
The integer variables k and j are introduced to represent the number of complete revolutions the satellite performs on the original and intermediate orbits, respectively. Because both maneuvers are performed at perigee, the satellite must make complete revolutions on the intermediate orbit before another maneuver can be performed. The variables k and j are typically equal if the change in arrival time is a small fraction of the original orbital period. The values used for k are listed in the third column of Table 2 . They were found by rounding down the ratio Δt G /P 0 . By doing this, the portions of time traveling from the target to perigee and then from perigee back to the target are taken into account and are not included in the available maneuver time. Values . Using standard orbital mechanics equations for the period and velocity, the ΔV associated with this maneuver is given by Equation 3. The total ΔV for the two burns is simply the ΔV calculated in Equation 3 multiplied by a factor of two, as seen in Equation 4. In the equations that follow, r p is the perigee radius, a 0 is the original orbit semi-major axis, and μ is the Earth's gravitational constant.
Using this simplified analytical method, the Δh a and ΔV results seen in Table 2 were obtained. The ΔV results varied from 0.082 to 0.735 km/s. As expected, in most cases a negative Δh a is required to advance a pass, while a positive Δh a is required to delay a pass. The only exception to this rule is in the TLEO case where decreasing the altitude by a significant amount is not feasible due to the low orbital altitude. Also, because the TLEO orbital period is short (~1.6 hrs), an arrival time change of +/-an hour represents a large fraction of the original orbital period. It is noted that in cases where the desired change in arrival time is approximately more than half of the original orbital period, it often requires less ΔV to phase the satellite the other direction in the orbit and obtain a similar result. Therefore, from the combination of the infeasibility of decreasing the orbital altitude and the shorter orbital period, the TLEO results show positive Δh a for each of the arrival time changes. In all cases, the minimum ΔV solution was found when k equaled j, as represented in the third column of Table 2 .
One thing to note is that in this preliminary analysis the rotation of the target from its original location (by the amount of time that you delay/advance the satellite) is not taken into account. Because of the Earth's rotation, if a satellite arrives 1 hour earlier/later to the target, the target will have moved approximately 15 deg east/west from the originally expected location. This will have an impact on the results, which may be significant.
A scenario was set up in an Aerospace Corporation simulation tool named SOAP (Satellite Orbit Analysis Program) to test the ΔV results obtained using this simplified analysis. Three separate satellites are propagated forward in an RGT9 orbit, and ΔV burns are applied to the second and third satellites to advance/delay its pass over the target. Both satellites make two revolutions in their respective intermediate orbit before returning to the original orbit. An elevation plot of the three satellites is seen in Figure 5 . In this plot, the origin of the time scale is arbitrarily chosen to show desired features of the elevation history. The original satellite (green line) sets below the 10 deg minimum elevation limit just before the three hour mark and does not rise again until 9.3 hrs. The satellite shifted to arrive one hour early (red) arrives at 8.5 hrs, which is slightly less than an hour change (Δt A = -0.8 hrs). The difference is due to the changed geometry between the target and the satellite at this early time. The satellite does not reach a very high elevation angle and the viewing time is much shorter.
In the case where the satellite is shifted to arrive late to the target by one hour (blue), the satellite arrives at 10.2 hrs (Δt A = +0.9 hrs). Looking closely at the graph, one sees two small blue passes before the scheduled overflight time. These additional passes do not reach above 10 deg elevation and the satellite remains out-of-view, but the passes are very close to the limit. If it was desired to shift the satellite by more than an hour, the second pass could have easily risen to above the 10 deg elevation limit and the target would be able to view the satellite earlier than expected. This illustrates that the rotation of the target during the advance/delay time can significantly alter the results. It also shows that, in some cases, phasing the satellite back, may actually allow the satellite to arrive early because of the rotation of the target. These types of trades, with the rotation of the target being taken into account, should be made in future analysis.
It is noted that the total ΔV costs will decrease if the requirements are relaxed and the orbit does not have to return to the original configuration before overflight occurs (by a factor of 2). This decision will be based on mission and payload requirements.
A second maneuver investigated will be used to employ the satellite as a key player in the battle scenario and synchronize its arrival to a desired location with land assets. Specifying the exact time to overfly a particular target is a much different problem than simply changing the arrival time by +/-1 hour. To adequately complete this maneuver, one needs the ability to be over any point on the globe given minimal notice and maneuver time. For this analysis, we assume that an overflight of a specified target is desired three days into the future, as would be appropriate for a 72 hour Space Tasking Order (STO) cycle.
This scenario is best viewed from the inertial perspective and becomes similar to a rendezvous problem. The location of the target three days into the future is known and therefore the problem can be reduced to having the satellite be at a specified location, with three days to perform the maneuver. We do not need to take into account the motion of the target or the satellite motion relative to the target. For simplicity, the overflight time is chosen so that the Greenwich hour angle equals zero. This allows easier interpretation of the results because the Prime Meridian (from which Longitude is measured) and the Vernal Equinox (from which RAAN is measured) coincide. Therefore, correlations can easily be made between the orbit orientation and the location of the target at the overflight time.
The target latitude and longitude are arbitrarily chosen as 33°N and 55°W, respectively. Given this, orbits with RAAN at approximately 300 -320 deg will line up with the target on the ascending pass. It is expected that there will be difficulties with orbits that have initial RAAN values around 30 deg because the orbit will be inclined away from where the target will be at the overflight time. In other words, the orbital plane will be normal (or close to normal) to the vector from the center of the Earth to the target. Since the target is in the northern hemisphere, it is expected that an initial argument of perigee of 270 deg will give the best overflight capabilities for the elliptic orbits.
It was found that plane changes are too costly and we restrict our maneuvers to raising the apogee altitude and a two-impulse argument of perigee change [1] . These maneuvers can be combined, but are treated separately in this initial analytic analysis. Note that in this analysis, we do not require the satellite to return to the original orbit before overflight occurs. Also in contrast to the previous analysis, it is assumed here that rephasing of the desired orbital true anomaly can be accomplished with little additional maneuver costs. Because of the longer 3 day maneuver time (instead of only 6 -10 hours) and the inclusion of other maneuvers in the analysis (that can be implemented incrementally to produce the desired phasing of the satellite), we do not include additional costs for rephasing. Apsidal rotation and nodal regression are taken into account during the 3 day maneuver.
To find the minimum ΔV required for each set of initial conditions, the built-in Excel Solver was used. The solver was formulated to determine the combination of apogee height change and argument of perigee shift that places the satellite above a 10 deg elevation angle at the overflight time for the minimal amount of ΔV. The apogee height was constrained to remain above the corresponding perigee height of each orbit. Parametrically, the initial RAAN and argument of perigee angles were varied from 0 -360 deg, by increments of 10 deg. By doing this parametrically, we explore the different orientation possibilities that the satellite could have when the maneuver is initiated.
The ΔV results are displayed in contour plots in Figure 6 and Figure 7 . The results give an idea of solutions to this problem, but were not proven to be global minimum solutions. ΔV maneuvers greater than 1.0 km/s are not realistic for today's spacecraft, especially if it desired to perform this maneuver on a regular basis. In Figure 6 , we see the results for the TLEO, SunSync, and RGT9 orbits. The TLEO orbit is circular and should not have a dependence on initial argument of perigee. This is consistent with the relatively vertical bands of ΔV regions.
It is seen that if the initial RAAN of the orbit is between approximately 160 -300 deg, then the satellite will be able to see the target by simply rephasing the satellite to the correct position. The areas between 300 -360 and 0 -160 deg show a steep ramp increasing towards the red > 1 km/s region. The red region is large for the TLEO orbit because it is at a low altitude. The solver cannot find a combination of mean anomaly, altitude change, and argument of perigee change that will make the satellite be above a 10 deg elevation angle at the time of overflight using less that 1.0 km/s.
The SunSync and RGT9 results are better, but still show areas of > 1 km/s ΔV. Because these orbits are elliptical, there is a strong argument of perigee dependence, with the lowest ΔV values at 270 deg. In terms of RAAN, the worst for the RGT9 is around 30 deg, which agrees with the TLEO results. The worst for the SunSync orbit, on the other hand, is centered around 210 deg. This is because the SunSync orbit has an inclination above 90 deg, which flips the coverage to the other side of the globe. For example, an orbit plane inclined at 45 deg has the same orientation as one that is inclined at 135 deg and rotated in right ascension by 180 deg. The only difference between the two is that satellites in these orbits will rotate in opposing directions of motion. This idea is why the worst initial RAAN for the SunSync orbit differs from the TLEO and RGT9 by 180 deg. It is assumed in an operational application that the orbit would be chosen to provide the greatest flexibility for the desired theater(s).
The general trends of the NCI8 results in Figure 7 match what is expected. The NCI8 orbit is at a higher altitude, giving it better viewing capability of the target, and requiring less ΔV to control the overflight than the previously examined orbits. The NCI8 shows one peculiar result. A dip is seen in the ΔV requirements at 90 deg initial argument of perigee, which would suggest that it was better to place the apogee in the southern hemisphere. This result can be seen clearer if one refers to the bottom left corner of the top plot in Figure 7 . Because the target is in the northern hemisphere, it is logical to place the apogee at the northern most point, but these results display just the opposite. Upon further investigation, it was found that the Excel solver had trouble converging to a solution in this region, which is believed to account for this seemingly erroneous result. Further research in this region is required.
The CI8 and COBRA orbits produced very similar results because they are both critically inclined. Overflight requires relatively little ΔV, unless the initial RAAN is near 30 deg. This initial RAAN is 90 deg from the target longitude; therefore the orbital maneuvers have to compensate for the orbital plane being normal to the target location vector. This is very difficult to do and results in very steep and sudden rises in ΔV. The COBRA orbit has slightly better overflight capabilities because it has a higher initial altitude. Realistically, Figures 6 and 7 show whether or not a satellite will be useful in overflying a particular target if there are tight constraints on the time that the target needs to be viewed. If a satellite operator has the ability to maneuver multiple satellites, the satellites can each be plotted on similar charts to evaluate the best satellite to move. To illustrate this concept, assume that we have two SunSync satellites. Let satellite A have a RAAN of 30 deg and an argument of perigee of 90 deg. Let satellite B have a RAAN of 300 deg and an argument of perigee of 150 deg. Using the middle plot in Figure 6 , one can determine that satellite B will require much less ΔV to perform the maneuver and be much more useful in this particular scenario. This type of comparison would not have been as obvious when strictly looking at the orbital properties of the satellites; the relationship of the satellites to the target at the particular time of interest is less apparent. This illustrates how these types of metrics can be useful to future spacecraft operators.
Tailoring Space Assets to a New Theater
Satellites are typically placed into orbit to view a specific theater of interest. The last maneuver that we examine in this paper is changing the theater of interest to a new location within a two week time period. Two weeks was chosen arbitrarily; further study could help refine this requirement. Changing the theater of interest given any initial orbit involves three key maneuvers:
(1) Argument of perigee change to place apogee in the same hemisphere as the new theater These maneuvers are similar to the ones used in earlier analysis, but are applied differently to achieve a new desired result.
To obtain quantitative data, theater locations were arbitrarily chosen and are listed in Table 3 . Theaters A and B can all be viewed for some length of time, however short, from satellites in each of the six original orbits. Even at a lower altitude and an inclination of 37 deg, the TLEO can get a glimpse of theaters at maximum latitudes of 51 deg. If a theater of interest were at any higher latitude than this, a plane change would be necessary to change the orbit to a higher inclination. The TLEO orbit will be able to view Theater A at 40 deg latitude, but will be passing below the theater on all passes. To maximize the viewing time by the TLEO orbit, the inclination should be set approximately 4 deg above the theater. This must be done with a 7 deg plane change, which is expensive, costing 0.93 km/s. The same reasoning applies for the NCI8 orbit because it is also at a low inclination. A satellite in the NCI8 orbit will be able to see theater A, but the viewing time can be increased with a plane change maneuver. The SunSync and RGT orbits are highly inclined and therefore can easily see the new theater A, without requiring a maneuver.
The CI8 and COBRA orbits are critically inclined and will view the new theater as long as the longitude is close An illustration of this concept is given in Figure 8 , where the COBRA ground track is shown in green and the satellite is positioned at apogee. The original theater is much closer to the apogee location of the groundtrack; therefore, the satellite will be able to see this theater for a much longer duration. When switching to Theater A, it is advised to adjust the longitude of the orbit to place apogee closer to the theater.
A change from the original theater to Theater B is similar to that of A, but involves a hemisphere change. Since the TLEO is circular, this has no affect on its ability to cover the theater. To tune this orbit to theater B, a plane change can be made to decrease the inclination of the TLEO orbit from 37 to 29 deg, which will cost 1.06 km/s ΔV.
For the elliptical orbits, it is necessary to rotate the argument of perigee by 180 deg so that maximum viewing time over Theater B will be achieved. A maneuver will be needed to rotate the argument of perigee by an amount 180 deg less the amount due to normal apsidal rotation. Until now, it is assumed that it is desired to keep the argument of perigee fixed at the values listed in Table 1 during theater viewing. Now, apsidal rotation is used to an advantage. The apsidal rotations for each orbit are listed in Table 4 , along with the amount of argument of perigee rotation that will occur in a two week period. The residual Δω is 180 deg minus the amount that the argument of perigee will rotate in the two week period. The ΔV to change the argument of perigee by the residual amount, using a two-impulse burn, is listed in Table 4 . In this case, having a high apsidal rotation rate is advantageous, but once the desired configuration is reached, cost to keep the configuration is high. If the task is short in duration, it may be acceptable to let the argument of perigee rotate. Longitude dependency will again be seen for the high altitude, repeating ground track orbits of CI8 and COBRA.
CONCLUSIONS
After looking at some of the desired capabilities, we have confirmed that there is a potential for spacecraft to conduct on-orbit maneuvers that will be useful for Responsive Space applications. The amount of ΔV required to perform these maneuvers were found to be highly dependent on the initial conditions and time limitations.
Altering the time of arrival seems to be a reasonable capability for many of the orbits examined. To shift the spacecraft's arrival time early or later by half an hour required ΔV maneuvers ranging from 80 to 300 m/s; while shifting the time of arrival by one hour required ΔV maneuvers that were approximately twice in size. If it is not necessary to return the satellite back to the original orbit before overflight occurs, the results could reduce by roughly a factor of two. In a real scenario, one of the key drivers for shifting the time of arrival while unobserved will be the adversary's sensing capability. In this situation, we assumed that the adversary has very good situational awareness in his theater, but very weak awareness of the satellite in other locations. Incorporating this type of information in the analysis and performing trades on adversary sensing capability, will be an interesting addition to the next phase of analysis. Also, a variable metric is needed to look at the benefits of adjusting the time of arrival vs. the orbital period. With the long loiter times of some of the critically inclined HEOs, requiring a change of only a half an hour is probably not as valuable. However, for a tailored LEO with roughly a 90 min period, a half hour or hour change in the time of overflight will be much more useful. For this reason, further study will likely require a different metric for each orbit, depending upon the likely mission of the spacecraft. This is yet another one of the reasons that trade studies of this type are difficult.
As shown in the results, trying to control overflight with the current three day time cycle of an Air Tasking Order (ATO) is very possible; however, the required ΔV is again greatly dependent on the initial relationship of the satellite with respect to the target. It is parametrically shown how varying the initial RAAN and argument of perigee drastically changes the results. The shrewd space mission planner is going to need to maintain the best orbital plane conditions for the general desired theater with a vision beyond this timeline. The user's ability to synchronize a satellite with ground activities will greatly increase if two (or more) maneuverable satellites are placed in orbit and positioned appropriately, instead of just one. Future studies will include how these contour plots change with allotted maneuver time.
The final capability that is examined with this analysis is the ability to change the desired primary theater of coverage. Two weeks is set as the arbitrary constraint, with the transition of hemisphere being the driving case, which is examined using apsidal rotation. The nodal regression is generally slower and much more expensive to change than the argument of perigee. We find that if the new theater is in the same hemisphere as the original theater, relatively little ΔV is required to fine tune the orbits to view the new theater. However, if the theaters are in different hemispheres, a 180 deg rotation of argument of perigee may be required for the elliptical orbits, which is costly. Again, with this capability we are faced with yet another question of how a space operator will manage a vehicle's orbital status. It is anticipated that a spacecraft's status will be managed as we manage the deployment of today's naval aircraft carrier battle groups or the Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) -around the world to best meet the perceived challenges of the day. This type of more in-depth parametric analysis will more the basis for how future Space Operators look at their ability to meet mission requirements.
WAY AHEAD
The concept of ΔV is a reasonable metric to start with for spacecraft maneuverability, but in the real world it is much more complex. ΔV is similar to the concept of range for a fighter aircraft, where it provides a rule of thumb for how far an aircraft can go before it needs to refuel or return to land. During an actual combat mission, the rules of engagement can significantly change if the range is longer than expected, as contingencies are held for a variety of situations. Generally, the actual usable range of an aircraft is significantly shorter than advertised. Analogous to range is spacecraft ΔV, where the total amount of velocity that the spacecraft is able to impart to maneuver. The smart spacecraft operator will make use of his environment -the Earth's oblateness, solar cycles, or even the moon -to aid in successfully completing the mission.
A dynamic spacecraft operator will also have to consider how changing orbital parameters effects other spacecraft performance issues. Pilots today worry about bird strikes and Foreign Object Damage (FOD) when operating in different environments required for the mission. In the future, a spacecraft commander will have to consider increased probability for Single Event Upsets (SEU) when mission requirements take them further into the Van Allen belts or a maneuver changes the eclipse times and forces changes to power and thermal management.
Technology is another area that can help us significantly. In using chemical propulsion, there is only so much total ΔV that can be squeezed on to a small platform. Electric propulsion offers an appealing potential. Despite requiring possibly twice the total ΔV because of the inefficiencies of the low thrust, electronic propulsion could increase total ΔV by an order of magnitude, likely require longer maneuver time. Further study will investigate these options.
The changing geometry is another piece of the dynamic spaceflight approach that could have tremendous applications for Radio Frequency (RF) application from space. Other effects such as space based Information Operations (IO) could shape how we look at space as a global utility provider. At this time, dynamic spaceflight is clearly still in its infancy. Analysis like this can start to show some of the possibility; however, doctrine without experimentation can only teach us so much. These new missions could open up a completely new approach for the application of space power that could truly lower the cost and fundamentally change how we look at space systems.
